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The Status of Free Will: A Philosophical and 
Empirical Analysis 
Gordon Kerns 
 
While the problem of Free Will has been 
deliberated for many years, it continues to be a relevant 
subject of discussion, for as Flanagan says, “The belief 
in free will is a central component of the dominant 
humanistic image in the West”12 (Flanagan, 111). Free 
Will13 is a very important, though mysterious, concept 
in the West, and so a problem with Free Will is a very 
important problem. This paper will explore why the 
supposed existence of this faculty is threatened, and 
whether or not the problematic aspects of Free Will can 
be identified and resolved. Unfortunately, large-scale 
speculation about the ramifications of my conclusions 
goes beyond the scope of this paper. The consequences 
of my findings should not sway any of my arguments 
for or against Free Will per se, as they are another 
problem altogether, and therefore will only be 
mentioned briefly. 
 Any investigation into the existence of Free 
Will must first define that which it is investigating. The 
difficulty in defining Free Will, though, is what makes 
understanding it so problematic. Due to the subjective 
nature of Free Will (in that, because my actions seem 
free to me I assume I have Free Will) the concept is 
vague at best, so any derivations made from this 
concept only blur the issue further. For example, eating 
                                                
12 Owen Flanagan, The Problem of the Soul (New York: Basic 
Books, 2002) 110-152 
13 In this paper I capitalize ‘free will’ when it is meant to refer to 
the concept “ordinary people of common sense” hold, namely a 
self-caused mode of mental processing—self-caused in the sense 
that there exist no antecedent conditions for its existence, save for 
the pure exercise of the will 
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a slice of pie that may or may not contain apples does 
not make it any easier to locate an apple in a grocery 
store. Without a clear definition you cannot even know 
what you are looking for. In order to clarify the matter 
to allow a sufficient understanding of Free Will’s 
current status, I will look at the various problems 
surrounding Free Will and some of the proposed 
solutions. Neither science—more specifically 
neuroscience—nor philosophy is sufficient on its own 
to paint a complete (or even satisfactory) picture of 
Free will, so with a combined analysis through both 
disciplines it will be shown that the classical conception 
of Free Will is irreparably flawed and our perceived 
capacity for free choice in general is an illusion.  
 
 The problem with Free Will as I have defined 
it—the self-caused mode of mental processing—is that 
it appears logically inconsistent with the theory of 
causality; if everything that exists is an effect of 
sufficient causes, there can be no self-caused actions. In 
an attempt to bypass this logical inconsistency, 
Libertarians claim that, “for any choice to be free, it 
must be absolutely uncaused”14 (Churchland, 203). But 
as Hume points out, “free choices and decisions are in 
fact caused by other events in the mind: desires, beliefs, 
preferences, feelings, and so forth” (Churchland, 203; 
from Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature). A choice 
with no antecedent determining desires, intentions or 
beliefs is actually considered out of that person’s 
control and not something they are held responsible for. 
Having never acquired much of a taste for coffee, if the 
desire to walk to the nearest coffee shop and order a 
double espresso suddenly popped into my head 
“without antecedent connection to my other desires 
                                                
14 Patricia Churchland, Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002) 203-236 
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or…general character” I would feel like someone was 
controlling my brain. Not only is responsible choice 
logically inconsistent with Libertarianism, but also by 
having to account for an uncaused entity that possesses 
intention, Libertarianism only confuses Free Will more. 
Since the Libertarian version of Free Will is 
incompatible with causality, it seems one of the two 
must be wrong. To help this matter, Flanagan says, 
“The regulative idea that this world…is fully natural, 
obedient at every juncture to whatever laws nature 
abides, has proved again and again to be progressive, to 
yield knowledge. The regulative ideal that holds out for 
the sort of causation required of free will has led 
nowhere” (Flanagan, 152). As we understand it now, 
the theory of causality is fundamental to the operations 
of the entire universe; Free Will only to humans. If one 
is wrong, it seems more likely to be the latter. For this 
reason I will focus on the issue of Free Will. 
Since Libertarianism fell short of providing a 
satisfactory account of Free Will, other solutions must 
be considered. The most straightforward solution might 
be to eliminate the idea of free will altogether. Would it 
be so bad if we only thought of ourselves as automata, 
reacting only to our environment like we suppose many 
non-human animals do? Why do we believe to possess 
a freedom of the will in the first place? For the latter, a 
simple answer may be that we have been conditioned to 
believe it. Every day instances occur where we seem to 
make a choice. When deliberating a course of action 
given two or more equal possibilities, the deciding 
factor seems to be nothing else than an exercise of the 
will (more on this topic will be discussed later). 
Furthermore, our whole lives we are held responsible 
for our actions, thus conditioning us to think of them as 
our actions (the significance for this will also be 
discussed later). 
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To answer the first question, yes, getting rid of 
free will completely would be bad. Perhaps the most 
substantial group of people to be affected would be 
participants of any religious faith that places 
consequences on various actions. For example, in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition a person’s actions (willed 
thought, behavior, etc.) determine their position in the 
afterlife. It does not make sense for us to be punished or 
rewarded for actions during life if we have no control 
over them. So if all of our choices are just links in the 
causal chain, they cannot be free. On the other hand, as 
mentioned earlier, supposing our choices are 
completely uncaused actually makes the picture worse. 
Also, in order to be responsible for our actions the 
religious view must be similar to Libertarianism in that 
free choices must be uncaused; they must be our 
choices. For a choice to be actualized—to have an 
effect in the world in the desired manner—a causal 
relationship must be present. Therefore Free Will 
necessitates causality. But the choice itself must be 
completely uncaused, leading to the view of the agent 
as a prime mover, itself unmoved. Such a capacity is 
generally reserved for God, and I doubt many 
theologians want to extend it to humans. 
A second reason for our actions to be our 
actions is that it seems “necessary to an agent’s learning, 
both emotionally and cognitively, how to evaluate the 
consequences of certain events and the price of taking 
risks” (Churchland, 236). Similarly, “It would 
undermine, possibly destroy, the meaning and 
significance of my life if I am not an agent, if who and 
what I am is in no way the result of choices I make” 
(Flanagan, 143). This is also the driving force behind 
the judicial and ethical systems in Western culture, and 
hence the removal of some way to ascribe responsibility 
would cause a big problem. 
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Given these responses it seems necessary that 
free will, in some form, exist. Therefore, “…to explain 
how the notion…of responsibility can make sense in the 
context of causation” (207), Churchland presents 
several traditional attempts at harmonizing caused and 
free choice (this distinction will be illuminated more 
completely later, but for now it suffices as is). First is 
the thought that “voluntary causes are internal, they 
involve the agent’s intentions, and the agent must be 
aware of his intention.” Churchland rejects this 
hypothesis by considering how a patient with 
obsessive-compulsive disorder may want and intend to 
wash his hands (for example), be aware of this desire 
and intention, know they are his, and yet the patient’s 
actions are considered out of his control. A second 
conception is that a choice is free if the agent could 
have done otherwise. Churchland dismantles this 
hypothesis as well by considering, “What exactly does 
‘could have done otherwise’ mean?” Churchland 
reasons, “If all behavior has antecedent causes, then 
‘could have done otherwise’ seems to boil down to 
‘would have done otherwise if antecedent conditions 
had been different.” Considering this interpretation 
reveals the unconstructive nature of the hypothesis. It is 
like saying “I would have done otherwise if I had done 
otherwise”; the antecedent conditions lead to a certain 
position, and a different position can be obtained only if 
the antecedent conditions lead to it (Churchland, 208-
210). 
Free Will is incompatible with causation, yet 
some form of free choice is still necessary for 
responsibility. In the previous paragraph, attempts to 
harmonize responsibility and causation were 
unsuccessful. The solution then is to eliminate Free 
Will as a self-caused mental faculty and investigate 
other possibilities. Continuing with the apple metaphor 
presented earlier, not only do you not know what apples 
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are, you cannot even be sure you ate some, nor whether 
they exist at the store. 
 
 This investigation will begin by coming to 
understand how the previous definition of free will led 
to inconsistencies, beyond consideration of causation. 
Flanagan presents the problem as mistakenly merging 
the “incoherent picture of free will to the ordinary 
conception of voluntary action” (Flanagan, 111). He 
believes it is necessary to separate the two concepts, 
and by differentiating between voluntary and 
involuntary action there will arise a new notion of free 
agency that does not involve “a self-initiating ego” that 
will still allow people the idea that they are free. 
 To this end it is not necessary to employ a 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary action 
that distinguishes “between acts initiated by a 
completely self-initiating will and those that are fully 
explicable in causal terms” (Flanagan, 112). According 
to Flanagan both voluntary and involuntary acts are 
caused, “it is not that one sort of act is caused and the 
other uncaused, or that one sort of act is caused by an 
agent who chooses in accordance with her ‘free will’” 
(Flanagan, 110). Instead, Flanagan says that the 
difference between the two types of acts is the way in 
which they are caused. The distinction comes when 
voluntary acts are thought to involve “the agent 
knowing what action she is performing and acting from 
reasons and desired that are her own” (Flanagan, 113). 
Basically, an act is voluntary if the agent is conscious 
of it as well as the internal antecedent conditions 
(desires, beliefs, reasons, etc.) that contribute to the act. 
 To illustrate this point Flanagan uses the 
example of how the pupil contracts in response to light 
(though any entity not governed by will works equally 
well). It is not possible to “will that my pupils not 
contract to light” for that capacity is not governed by 
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the will. While direct manipulation of the pupil is not 
possible, it is possible to intervene by manipulating a 
different system that in turn can act on the pupil. “…if I 
don’t want my pupils to contract there is something I 
can do, namely close my eyes. If I know what is 
happening and can find a system or subsystem that is 
cognitively penetrable, in this case the motor system, I 
can intervene to get the result I want” (Flanagan, 113). 
Similarly, it is not possible to will your heart to beat 
faster, but by consciously accelerating your breathing 
rate or doing some jumping jacks you can achieve the 
desired effect. 
This example shows how we are able to 
override certain processes, which we would normally 
have no control of, by being aware of our desires and 
actions and manipulating a process we can control. The 
process of manipulating the motor system is still a 
result of some causal process, it is just that we can be 
aware of it and so can react to it. 
 An important note about this interpretation of 
voluntary versus involuntary acts is that since the act is 
still a result of some causal process, we are no freer to 
choose one act over the other. This means that from the 
perspective of causality, both acts are identical; they are 
equally caused. The difference then is how the acts 
appear from our perspective. Well, by even using the 
term perspective I have shown the difference. Actions 
are voluntary if they, along with the reasons and desires 
that gave rise to them, reach our consciousness. If we 
are not conscious of an action or of the reasons that 
gave rise to it, it is involuntary. 
This leads to the conclusion that acts are never free in 
terms of the Libertarian notion of Free Will. On the 
down side, this means we really are just reacting to the 
world around us and don’t have executive control over 
our actions. To get away from all of the problems this 
conclusion can cause, the plus side is that things still 
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appear the same to us. Free Will either exists or it 
doesn’t regardless of how humans conceive of the 
world and therefore it is possible to redefine the notion 
of free will so that it fits better with our causal 
conception of the world and still retain the perception 
of a capacity to make free choices. If it still seems the 
same to us, if we still believe we can make free choices, 
then there is no effect on the entities that require a form 
of free will to exist (i.e., the Western ethical and 
judicial systems). 
 
 The conclusion that we can act voluntarily but 
Free Will is an illusion, as shown by Flanagan, was 
derived philosophically. There exists a discrepancy 
among definitions, and by sorting these out we come to 
a viable theory. What is important is what science can 
tell us about this theory. Since everything has been 
included in the causal chain that is the physical world, it 
is possible to test the theory empirically. There have 
been multiple experiments that lend support to this 
theory that we do not actually make free decisions but 
instead are only aware of some thought processes and 
actions and not others. I will discuss one such 
experiment carried out by Benjamin Libet. 
 Libet’s experiment showed that a subject’s 
cerebral cortex would prepare for a movement a short 
time before the subject was conscious of it, seeming to 
suggest that the supposedly conscious decision to move 
had actually been determined unconsciously beforehand. 
 The experiment involved 5 subjects, each put 
through at least 6 different experimental sessions 
consisting of 40 self-initiated movements. The subjects 
were asked to move one hand at an arbitrary moment 
decided by them, and to report when they made the 
decision. At the same time the electrical activity of their 
brain was monitored. Subjects were able to obtain 
timings related to their mental experiences by observing 
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a Wundt clock, on which there was a small light that 
went around a circle every 2.56 seconds15 (NC).“The 
reportable time for appearance of the subjective 
experience of ‘wanting’ or intending to act” was 
compared with “the recordable cerebral activity that 
precedes a freely voluntary, fully endogenous motor 
act”16 (Libet). This preceding cerebral activity is called 
the ‘readiness potential’ and was found by Kornhuber 
and Deecke in 1964 (NC) when they averaged many 
EEG recordings from subjects who were about to move 
a finger. They discovered that the increase in potential 
could start up to 2 seconds before the movement. 
 Using this information, Libet found that for 
experimental sessions in which the subject “reported 
that all of the 40 self-initiated movements in the series 
appeared ‘spontaneously’ and capriciously,” the 
readiness potential preceded the reported time of 
intention to act by an average of 350 ms. Trials “in 
which an experience of preplanning occurred in some 
of the 40 self-initiated acts,” the readiness potential 
preceded the reported time by an average of 500 ms. 
Comparable values were yielded when two different 
modes of recall were utilized. The “subjects 
distinguished awareness of wanting to move from 
awareness of actually moving” and the reported times 
for wanting to move were “consistently and 
                                                
15 The Neuroscience of Consciousness (NC). 
http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~lka/conz3a.htm (last visited 
12/17/2004) 
16 Benjamin Libet, et al. Time of conscious intention to act in 
relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The 
unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. (Oxford University 
Press 1983) Brain 106, Issue 3: 623-642 
http://brain.oupjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/106/3/623?maxtos
how=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&author1=libet&
andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=1102889927874_1364&stored_
search=&FIRSTINDEX=0&sortspec=relevance&resourcetype=1&
journalcode=brain (last visited 12/17/2004) 
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substantially…in advance of” the mean times reported 
for the awareness of actually moving (Libet). 
 Libet concludes that the “cerebral initiation of a 
spontaneous, freely voluntary act can begin 
unconsciously, that is, before there is any…subjective 
awareness that a ‘decision’ to act has already been 
initiated cerebrally” (Libet). Before interpreting Libet’s 
results further, it is important to acknowledge several 
challenges. First, the significance of readiness 
potentials could be brought into question. If it is found 
that readiness potentials are not what previously 
thought, the whole experiment could be rejected. 
Second, and to me most importantly, there seems to be 
much room for error when the time-scale of the 
experiment is in the hundredths of seconds. Given that 
the experiment relies on detecting and comparing brain 
activity, and that there exist at least two mental 
reporting processes (one to do with the occurrence of 
the decision, and one to do with the state of the clock) it 
is possible that any judgment of simultaneity could be 
problematic—a very small difference in time could 
throw off the whole experiment. Also, the small number 
of test subjects may incorrectly represent the larger 
population. 
 Fortunately, Libet’s results have been 
reproduced (Keller & Heckhausen 1990), substantiating 
them enough to draw conclusions. While the results 
pose a problem for the “potentiality for conscious 
initiation and control of voluntary acts” (Libet), they 
“are consistent with the idea of the cortex as a modeling 
system that constructs a consistent model of events to 
pass on to whatever mediates conscious experience” 
(NC). This is a fancy way of saying that free will is an 
illusion. 
 
 It seems that a rational reconsideration of the 
notion of free will from the philosophical perspective, 
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as well as studies in the empirical sciences, agree that 
not only is Free Will as a self-caused mental faculty 
incompatible and incoherent, but also that our capacity 
for free choice is an illusion. Empirical evidence shows 
the illusion to be due the extremely close proximity of 
the conscious forming of an intention, the unconscious 
preparation for an action, and the execution of that 
action. Philosophically, Flanagan claims the illusion is 
due to the fact that we “overrate the causes we are in 
touch with first-personally.” He explains, “When I 
deliberate and choose among the options before me, I 
am in touch with the relevant processes, the processes 
of deliberation and choice. I am not in touch 
with…what causes me to deliberate and weight my 
options as I do” (Flanagan, 114). It is this misstep that 
that causes us to perceive deliberation as self-caused. 
 Of course it is not possible to satisfy everybody 
with this new theory of free will, I doubt theologians 
are willing to concede uncaused choices, but for most 
people the change should not affect anything except 
their mindset. The non-existence of a self-causing entity 
resolves the issue of causation. The most important 
thing to consider is the consequences this theory has on 
responsibility. How can we have an ethical system? 
How can we justify putting someone in jail? How can 
people learn how to evaluate consequences of events 
and the price of taking risks? The answer to all of these 
is simple: changing the definition of free will does not 
change its role in our society. If the theory is correct 
and free choice is an illusion, then it is the case that it 
has always been an illusion, we just were not aware of 
it, and so it is obviously possible for all the things we 
have to continue to exist. It doesn’t matter if it is an 
illusion if we still believe we are in control. 
